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Introduction:
The Legacy of The Will to Power
In the Summer of 1888, Friedrich Nietzsche was working on his philosophical magnum
opus, The Will to Power. Just a year before his fatal mental breakdown, Nietzsche tasked himself
with compiling a clear and unmistakable rendition of his philosophy; a task seemingly
antithetical, and perhaps irreconcilable, with his established philosophical body of work, which
sought to philosophize poetically and romantically, aphoristically dancing around the truth rather
than theoretically stabbing at it. The English translator for The Will to Power, Anthony M.
Ludovici, notes in his preface to the text that his early, unconventional, and playful approach to
philosophy ultimately motivated Nietzsche to write The Will to Power: “The reception given to
Thus Spoke Zarathustra had been so unsatisfactory, and misunderstandings relative to its
teaching had become so general that Nietzsche was already beginning to see the necessity of
bringing his doctrines to the public in a more definite and unmistakable form” (WTP 5).
Unfortunately, Nietzsche’s ambitious final project was tragically cut short and all that remains is
his journals, notes, and loose sketches compiled in one large volume.
This large volume, The Will to Power, sees Nietzsche working towards erecting a grand,
all-encapsulating “theory of everything” grounded in his doctrine of the will to power. The will
to power—which will be further expounded upon in great detail in chapter one of this thesis—
can most simply and pragmatically be defined as a monistic, reductive theoretical force which
Nietzsche narrowly associates with human psychology and broadly associates with the essential
nature of existence. To define the doctrine of the will to power as a reductive theoretical force is
to define it as a concept which Nietzsche employs not only to describe but also to explain, the
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operations of the universe as a whole; it is to identify the thrust of everything under one singular
and coherent concept. This amounts to Nietzsche’s attempt to transcend the human, all too
human, correspondence with the manifold of being and therefore arrive at a purer notion of
Truth.1
Unfortunately for the spirit of Nietzsche, a survey of the academic reception of The Will
to Power reveals that Nietzsche’s later theoretical renditions of his philosophy have only served
to muddy the waters of his grand philosophical goals and ambitions. For instance, Alexander
Nehamas, a highly noted Nietzsche scholar, declared in his book Nietzsche: Life as Literature
that the doctrine of the will to power as articulated in The Will to Power is “a barely plausible
and quite horrible theory of behavior, according to which ruthless individuals, or worse, races
and even species constantly overpower equally ruthless but weaker opponents” (Nehamas 75). In
Nehamas’s criticism, we are greeted with a common approach shared among those who quickly
reject the will to power: that the moral implications of the doctrine are, in their view,
unacceptable and therefore a rejection of the doctrine is justified. As I will demonstrate in the
following chapter, another—much more thought out—form of criticism towards the will to
power exists among Nietzsche scholars, one which points out that there is a fundamental
contradiction and paradox between Nietzsche’s explicit anti-ontological approach to philosophy
and the seemingly ontological form the doctrine the will to power assumes in The Will to Power2.

To spell “Truth” with a capital T is intentional: I am not referring to truth in the sense of being veridical;
rather “Truth” refers to an ultimate realization of the “Truth of everything” (i.e., the truth of a final
framework which accounts for each thing in particular) rather than “the truth of something”.
1

Due to the broadness of the term, it is important to clarify that when I use the word “ontological” I am
referring to a philosophical system which claims to bear the Truth of Being and the universe according to
a single, omni-explanatory systematic construction of ideas.
2
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To write off the will to power as immoral and or not essential to the heart of Nietzsche’s
philosophy is to neglect the simple fact that Nietzsche himself explicitly told us it is: “This world
is the Will to Power—and nothing else! And even ye yourselves are this all to power—and
nothing besides!” (WTP 481). These were the final words published under Nietzsche’s name, and
to identify his final project as unessential to his earlier works is to study an incomplete rendition
of Nietzsche. It is to survey some trees rather than the whole forest. It is also a mistake to assume
that Nietzsche’s ideas in The Will to Power shouldn’t be taken seriously because of the project’s
incomplete nature. Regardless of what Nietzsche left us, the philosophical goal of this final
project was to articulate the world as will to power in a more theoretical and unmistakable
fashion than he ever had before. It was Nietzsche who told us the truth is terrible, and as
Nietzsche scholars, we ought not to bar a proper examination of the doctrine of the will to power
and its relation to the whole of his philosophy for any alleged moral atrocities. To denounce the
will to power as a morally problematic doctrine is to suppose one has fully grasped, examined,
and understood the doctrine in connection with the rest of Nietzsche’s philosophy; however, as I
will demonstrate in chapter one, the majority of criticism on the will to power de facto rejects the
doctrine as, the critics claim, it must be a priori inconsistent with Nietzsche’s doctrine of
perspectivism and denial of metaphysical truths, and therefore the will to power should be set
aside or apologetically revised to understand Nietzsche.
In this thesis I will demonstrate that the paradoxical clash between Nietzsche’s
systematic articulation of the will to power and his anti-ontological stance is not sufficient
grounds for the denouncement of the doctrine of the will to power in relation to the rest of
Nietzsche’s philosophy but is, rather, an illustration which pierces further to the heart of
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Nietzsche’s philosophy more than any surface-level reading neglecting the will to power ever
could. To synthesize the doctrine of the will to power—as Nietzsche put it—with the rest of
Nietzsche’s philosophy, and to examine the paradox and irony which necessarily arises will
reveal a deeply buried interpretive layer of Nietzsche’s philosophy neglected by many Nietzsche
scholars. If Nietzsche is right and there are no facts, only interpretations, and we—along with our
systems of thought—are necessarily trapped beneath the ice of our subjectivity, what are we to
do with philosophy as an intellectually productive enterprise? Indeed, Nietzsche employed his
philosophy as a destructive force upon countless ideologies, yet when he tried to posit his
philosophy in a more direct and systematic manner, he exposed himself to the same criticisms he
used to topple the monuments of other philosophies.
Michel Foucault, an astute reader of Nietzsche, undoubtedly recognized this paradox, and
this thesis will utilize Foucault’s writings on Nietzsche and his understanding of power (as
opposed to the will to power) as a guide to assist in dissecting, examining, and understanding
what exactly is happening within the deeply knotted roots of Nietzsche’s thought, the paradoxical
object which he wished to articulate but never did (never could?). By examining Nietzsche and
Foucault’s philosophical methodologies of genealogy, I will illustrate the inherent paradoxes
which arise when Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole is considered. A consequence of using
Foucault to illuminate the more obscure portions of Nietzsche’s philosophy is that the refined
Nietzschean lens will clarify the otherwise unwieldy question of Foucauldian power. However,
the primary outcome for the purposes of this project of placing Nietzsche's and Foucault’s
similar yet differing approaches to philosophy side by side, is to establish a more grounded
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understanding of how the will to power relates to the rest of Nietzsche’s philosophy will be
reached.
This thesis ultimately argues that Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power is not only
inseparable from the rest of his philosophy but actually lies within the heart of his philosophy
despite the apparent paradoxical consequences this entails. In that case, Michel Foucault’s
differential approach to understanding power represents an attempt to arrive at a completion and
refinement of Nietzsche’s final project while simultaneously removing its paradoxical quality. As
should be expected, this discussion will raise additional issues and questions. However, the
excruciating tasks of understanding and of accepting the paradoxes which arise in Nietzsche will
not only provide very deep insight into his philosophy but also into the task of the philosopher
and her or his ability to emancipate Truth from being.
Chapter One of this thesis will be dedicated to a thorough examination of Nietzsche’s
doctrine of the will to power and its relation with the rest of his philosophy. I will show that once
Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole is considered, the will to power emerges as a central concept,
fermenting through the course of his career as it developed into its systematized form in The Will
to Power.
Next, Chapter Two will elaborate on Foucault’s differential understanding of power,
which will be illustrated by examining how the two different philosophers approach the
methodology of genealogy and ontology in general. This examination will demonstrate that
Foucault developed his philosophy through a strict adherence to a rejection of ontological
construction. Marking Foucault’s departure from Nietzsche will be an essential instrument for
understanding the paradox of Nietzsche, the anti-systematizer, forming his own system.
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Chapter Three will build off the genealogical focus of the previous chapter and will
broadly introduce Nietzsche’s philosophical work, The Genealogy of Morals. This contextual
introduction will serve as a stepping stone into a case study in the following chapter concerning
the relationship between ontology and paradox within Nietzsche’s philosophy while relying on
Foucault’s contrasting philosophical methodology to better understand the meaning of the
inherent contradictions which arise in Nietzsche’s philosophy.
Chapter Four will cover the major themes of the “First Essay” of The Genealogy of
Morals as a medium to demonstrate: 1) the doctrine of the will to power is an assumption
inherent to Nietzsche’s philosophical works, even if he does not explicitly state it as such; 2) the
presence of this ontological device renders Nietzsche’s philosophy knotted in paradox; and 3)
Foucault’s approach helps understand why this paradox arises and what it really is.
This essay will conclude with a chapter dedicated to reflecting upon these ontologically
induced Nietzschean paradoxes and how this impacts what we can gain from reading Nietzsche.
Ultimately, this concluding chapter will broadly meditate over what it means to be a philosopher,
what limitations are inherently placed upon the philosopher, and how the philosopher must
paradoxically overcome these limitations if she or he wishes to make positive philosophical
claims.
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Chapter 1
Nietzsche and The Will to Power
In this chapter I will discuss Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power and its relation to the
rest of his philosophy. To start, I will demonstrate that Nietzsche’s systematic rendition of the
will to power is not simply an anomaly that appeared near the end of his life, but is rather the
result of a conceptual fermentation which developed over time throughout the course of his
writing career. Following this conceptual grounding, a discussion of the paradox of Nietzsche’s
rendition of the will to power as a naturalist ontology will be conducted.3 This discussion of
paradox lurking in the depths of Nietzsche’s philosophy will lead to a survey of the scholarly
reception of the paradox of the will to power and how different academics have tried to revise,
negate, or account for the doctrine in relation to the rest of his philosophy. The chapter will then
close by introducing a parallel moral dilemma which arises with Nietzsche’s usage of the will to
power and will further illustrate just how deep this paradox runs through Nietzsche’s philosophy.
Broadly speaking, the notion of the will to power is an ontological force underlying
human psychology and behavior. The will to power is the force that propels humans to act
towards specific ends, all of which are predicated upon a person or group expressing or garnering
power. Consequently, the will to power is the engine that fuels the ebbs and flows of culture and
morality. This brief introductory explanation in no way captures all the complexity and gravity of
the will to power, however, it will serve as a practical starting point for our investigation.
To understand the problem of Nietzsche’s ontological conception of the will to power is
to understand that it is intrinsically linked to the development of the concept through the course
Naturalist in the sense that Nietzsche employs the doctrine of the will to power to explain all
phenomenon in the natural world.
3
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of his philosophical career. In one of his earliest works, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche
identifies two universal human impulses, “The Dionysian” and “The Apollonian.” Nietzsche
described the Dionysian as “The liberation of unbounded instinct, the breaking loose of the
unbridled dynamism of animal and divine nature” (BOT 227). The Dionysian impulse is
characterized by intoxication, madness, and enthusiasm while the Apollonian is contrastingly
characterized by rationality, appearance, and a calm demeanor. Nietzsche argued these two
psychological forces intermingled in a dialectical struggle which created ancient Greek art and
its characteristic traits. While it cannot be said the will to power is directly comparable to these
two early Nietzschean concepts, the differing conceptions are yet intrinsically related in the
development of Nietzsche’s thought, as the will to power, the Dionysian, and the Apollonian are
all a priori and universal psychological drives which underlies all human discourse and activity.
Nietzsche’s early conception of the Dionysian and Apollonian can be viewed as the embryo of
the ontological articulation of will to power, a concept further elaborated upon as Nietzsche
shifted his study from Greek antiquity to morality and human psychology.
Nietzsche first explicitly points to the will to power in The Gay Science (1882). This
essential text was characteristic of Nietzsche’s early style. He wrote in aphorism, essay, poem,
and song. Never being too clear, always seeming just out of the reader’s grasp. He intentionally
styled his writing so as to necessitate interpretation, and much of what Nietzsche is “really
getting at” is buried deep beneath layers of context and literary playfulness. He did not write in a
logical argumentative structure, rather he whimsically sprang from topic to topic as he pleased,
refusing to systematize his thought. In this book we see Nietzsche nodding towards the will to
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power, but not demarcating it, not encapsulating it, but instead hinting to the reader that it is
present. In aphorism thirteen “On the Theory of the Sense of Power” he writes:
In doing others well or ill, we want no more than to exert power over them! In
doing ill, we hurt those to whole we need to make our power palpable…In doing
well and wishing well, we help those who somehow or other already depend on us;
we want to increase their power, because in doing so we increase our own (TGS
46).
Notice that Nietzsche does not explicitly refer to the will to power anywhere in this section,
rather he tacitly assumes that a psychological mechanism in line with the will to power dictates
human interaction. If Nietzsche did not already hold the assumption of the universality of the
will to power, the statement above has zero ground and loses all meaning. How can one claim
that all our social interactions are predicated upon garnering power without holding a very
specific view of how the world operates? While Nietzsche does not explicitly elaborate on his
theory of the will to power in The Gay Science, this passage nonetheless demonstrates he already
assumed the will to power as an explanation for human psychology.
Nonetheless, before Nietzsche points out in The Gay Science that there is a will towards
power underlying moral affairs, he does not first sketch out and systematize an ontological
subject which is causing these things to happen, rather he is making what he sees as self-evident
observations and allowing the reader to interpret what lurks beneath these seemingly
spontaneous and scattered observations. It is important to note that, early in his career, Nietzsche
only refers to the will to power to explain human psychology and it is not necessarily related to
an ontological framework.
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As Nietzsche continued to write, the importance of the will to power began to expand and
centralize itself at the heart of his work. In Beyond Good and Evil (1886), Nietzsche most
explicitly wrote about the will to power than in any other of his previously published works. He
vividly describes the will to power in very small and scattered yet precise chunks throughout the
book. This elaboration of the will to power is directly related to the purpose of the book, which is
to transcend to a place beyond the constraints of a moral understanding of the world, a place
beyond good and evil. In section 259 Nietzsche writes:
[Anything which] is a living and not a dying body... will have to be an incarnate
will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant - not from
any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will
to power...'Exploitation'... belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic
function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will to life.
(BGE 84).
In this passage it takes little interpretation to see that Nietzsche believes there is a universal drive
within all humanity—all life—which is unconscious, directional, and omnipresent. As Nietzsche
puts it, to live is to will oneself towards power. This will to power is the byproduct after stripping
morality away from our inquiries into the nature of existence. Indeed, Nietzsche is clearly
staking explicitly ontological claims in this section. The will to power is a driving force
underlying all individuals, which makes us strive towards the exertion of power over others. This
inevitably leads to reality being conceptualized as a large network of individual bodies
perpetually struggling against one another (towards “power”) for eternity, all operating under the
singular and universal doctrine of the will to power.
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Beyond Good and Evil is written in a similar style to most of his earlier works. However,
his more explicit elaborations on the will to power specifically mark a change in direction from
his initial aphoristic philosophic trajectory. An unavoidable paradox arises when Nietzsche gives
positive accounts of the will to power. Because Nietzsche’s philosophy adheres to the doctrine of
perspectivism and is therefore fundamentally anti-ontological, he did not believe the ontological
cogs moving the world could ever be fully grasped and articulated through rational
systematization, as the world is inherently not rational. As he states in his polemic against
religions and philosophies of old, The Twilight of the Idols (1889) “I mistrust all systematizers
and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity” (TOI 35). He viewed ontological
constructions such as God, the atom, morality, and the soul, as to be necessarily fictitious as they
treat existence as a static and mechanistic theory rather than a robust and dynamic activity. The
idea that the universe is composed of individual bodies adhering to specific, morally grounded,
and calculable laws is something we would like to believe because belief systems as such
(religion, secularism, political ideology) endow life with meaning when at bottom, for Nietzsche,
there is none.
As a result of this anti-ontological Nietzschean philosophic attitude, Nietzsche’s integrity
is called into question when the will to power is brought under examination. If the will to power
is universally embedded throughout all life, and if the origin of the will to power is embedded
within individual subjects operating under a priori principles, it would appear as though
Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power itself is an ontological one he ought to criticize from
an anti-ontological standpoint.
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How are we to reconcile the whole of Nietzsche’s philosophy with this deeply embedded
ontological paradox? On the one hand, there is the critical Nietzsche, he who philosophizes with
a hammer. This version of Nietzsche does not create but rather polemically annihilates and
deconstructs others’ positive philosophical creations. On the other hand, there is Nietzsche the
creator, he who wills his own vision of “Truth” to parchment as a positive philosophical
creation.4 I argue that this paradoxical crossroads in Nietzsche is not simply a case of cognitive
dissonance or arrogance on Nietzsche’s behalf, but is rather an illustration of the tragic fate of the
philosopher and her or his craft.
Due to the restraints of subjectivity and the impenetrable nature of the noumenal world,
any positive conceptual construct must necessarily be grounded in thin conceptual air (a nonground). For this reason, any philosophical articulation of the world as a system is necessarily
doomed to collapse in on itself and crumble downwards into the abyss indefinitely. I suspect
Nietzsche was keenly aware of this fact, yet he nonetheless endeavored himself to create his own
conceptual castle on a groundless ground. If Nietzsche lacked this ambition to create his own
philosophical system, (despite the paradoxical implications of doing so) he would have never
been remembered for anything more than being a very talented philologist at Leipzig University.
Gaze into Nietzsche’s dark and solemn eyes in Edvard Munch’s painting “Portrait of Friedrich
Nietzsche,” to grasp a visual representation of the tragic fate the philosopher must necessarily be
met with. Have we as philosophers simply thought ourselves into a strange loop we cannot
possibly escape? For now, this discussion of paradox in Nietzsche and its relation to the

By a positive system of truth I mean a system of truth which is directly posited as true. Not positive in
an affirmative sense (although this countervailing definition of positive does hold weight in Nietzsche’s
philosophy).
4
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philosopher will be bracketed; however these ideas must be kept in mind as this thesis
progresses.
This tragic fate the philosopher finds itself in will be made more evident by an
examination of Nietzsche’s latest work, The Will to Power, a posthumous collection of sketches,
notes, and essays surrounding the project before the expiration of life cut it short. In The Will to
Power we see Nietzsche trying to soberly and systematically flesh out the amorphous concept of
will to power, his positive philosophical construction. For instance:
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to
extend its force (—its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its
extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies
and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are
sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the
process goes on (WTP 636).
It is not difficult to see how a student of Nietzsche would find it difficult to reconcile this later
iteration of the will to power with other perspectivist aspects of his philosophy. Such a clear,
systematic, and ontological description of the will to power is surely helpful to understand the
idea, but a close reader of Nietzsche will notice once this idea is crystalized (necessarily
mummified) it becomes contrary to his perspectivist, anti-ontological approach to philosophy.
This systematic construction renders a conception of power in which a vast network of opposing
forces are constantly stuck in a dominance-repression dichotomy. To offer an analogy, this
ontological articulation of the will to power harkens to an early atomist view of the world.
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Particles (wills to power) are simply colliding and interacting with one another and that is the
nature of everything at bottom.
As alluded to in my introduction, much scholastic controversy has erupted over this
paradoxical issue. Many Nietzsche scholars have tried to reconcile this later doctrine with the
rest of his philosophy, and many have also pushed back on this doctrine, identifying it as a
source of error and contradiction in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Richard Schact, a prominent expert
on Nietzsche, argues that Nietzsche’s denunciation of metaphysics is concerned with ontological
claims which denies “this” world for “True or other worlds,” and therefore Nietzsche is simply
presenting his views on “this” world, and thus the will to power is compatible (Clark 206).
Alexander Nehamas, the scholar referred to in the introduction, argues that the conception of the
will to power is not an ontology but rather amounts to a denial of the thing-in-itself and therefore
is a denial of ontological claims (207). Walter Kauffman, a revered Nietzsche translator and
scholar, argued that the will to power is not an a priori metaphysical claim about the world, but is
instead a concept arrived at by empirical induction which provides us a helpful framework for
understanding many psychological phenomena (208).
Maudemarie Clark, in her book Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, after briefly
surveying the aforementioned Nietzsche scholars, wholly denounces the will to power as
incoherent with Nietzsche’s body of work as a whole.
I have argued that Nietzsche’s doctrine of will to power is not a doctrine at all.
Although Nietzsche says that life is will to power, he also gives us clues that he
does not regard this as a truth or a matter of knowledge, but a construction of the
world from the viewpoint of his values. However this is only half the story, for it
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is not plausible to interpret everything Nietzsche says about power in this way. He
clearly claims all sorts of knowledge of the human desire for power, for example,
and this is the other side of the story (227).
For Clark, if the will to power is accepted as a doctrine, and Nietzsche appears to do so, the rest
of Nietzsche’s work becomes consequently knotted in paradox and contradiction. The problem
arises when Nietzsche centralizes the thrust of the will to power within individual bodies—
fundamentally ontological units (like “the soul”) which are a priori imbued with an ethereal force
which directs and explains behavior. For Clark, the will to power also conflicts with Nietzsche’s
doctrine of subjectivism; that there are no facts only interpretations highly constrains what
Nietzsche can say about the world and to what degree we can take him seriously. Nietzsche
articulates his vision of the will to power as though it is a matter of fact, and proceeds to use this
as the starting point for his ontology in The Will to Power. This clearly calls into question
Nietzsche’s integrity regarding philosophical matters.
Before proceeding, I would like to point out that Clark is wrong to the extent that the
doctrine of the will to power is not entirely inconsistent with Nietzsche’s notion of
perspectivism. While a paradox necessarily arises depending on how explicitly Nietzsche
articulates the doctrine of the will to power, the will to power is fundamentally a subjective
drive. It is not unidirectional despite the grammar of “the will to power is the exertion of one’s
power.” The way one understands the exertion of one’s own power is completely subject to the
circumstances of the individual. A fundamental Christian will view “power” differently than a
world-class bodybuilder. That much is plain. Our subjective interaction with the world informs
how and what ideal of power to strive towards, and these understandings take the form of
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ideological systems which purportedly reveal the “Truth” of the happenings around us. The
fundamental Christian’s individual understanding of power can therefore be prodded and
uncovered by exploring their personal understanding of how the world works. It is no mistake
that the one who believes in an omnipotent God views this God as the main source of power to
strive towards in their life.
The fact humans subjectively interpret and therefore systematize the world as “objective”
is a result of a will to exert power over the world in order for our primordial desires to be
satiated. For Nietzsche, it is necessitated within our very being that we forge (as opposed to
discover) meaning (as opposed to The Meaning) in our lives. This is because there is no “True”
meaning to be found at the bottom of our inquiries into the world. As Nietzsche puts it, “The will
would rather will nothingness than not will” (GOM 97). God did not exist as a concept until
humanity forged the concept itself. This clearly alludes to the ontological paradox I have
identified. While it may be the case that the philosopher is trapped within a tragic and strange
loop of subjectivity, at the end of the day we are human and humans are predisposed to create.
Therefore, Nietzsche’s doctrine of subjectivism is not entirely incoherent with the will to power
because it is the will to power itself which generates and reinforces subjective interpretations of
the world.5 This is, of course, Nietzsche’s own interpretation, and to take Nietzsche seriously one
must grasp and understand this paradoxical nature of the will to power, as it is a quintessential
concept in his philosophy.

The problem arises, however, when Nietzsche universalizes the will to power as ontology and articulates
it as the ultimate “Truth” for everybody and everything indefinitely. Despite the will to power being a
subjective drive, Nietzsche nonetheless crosses the line by articulating it as ontology as a matter of fact.
5

Walter 21
Perhaps the younger Nietzsche anticipated this issue while writing The Gay Science. In
aphorism 121, “Life No Argument,” Nietzsche writes:
We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live—by the postulating
of bodies, lines, surfaces, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content:
without these articles of faith no one could manage to live at present! But for all
that they are still unproved. Life is no argument; error might be among the
conditions of life. (TGS 131)
Perhaps Nietzsche recognized the contradictory nature of his philosophy as a positive enterprise,
and perhaps this was an intended error, left for future philosophers to pick up. Perhaps Nietzsche
employed paradox and contradiction in an attempt to mirror the paradox and contradiction of
existence as a whole. We can only speculate as to what Nietzsche would have published in his
final project, The Will to Power, but it is clear that his work was ultimately left incomplete. The
paradoxical problem for the interpreter of locating the origin for the exertion of power—namely
identifying individual “wills” to power—and its ontological implications are unavoidable when
evaluating Nietzsche as a whole.
This ontological paradox which arises when evaluating Nietzsche’s work also gives rise
to a moral paradox within his later period polemical works condemning systems of morality. As
Nietzsche grew older and his work became more systematic, he also became more polemic, more
morally charged, and more vocal in his attacks on religious faiths. Nietzsche profusely
pronounced Christian morality to be a symptom of decadence, infesting and degrading mankind
due to its inhibitions placed on the will to power. He viewed it a perversion of the “noble
morality,” one more in line with a purer expression of the will to power, as exemplified by Greek
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society. By holding such a stance, Nietzsche does to the Christian faith what the Christian faith
did to noble societies. Much in the same way that he also becomes a crafter of ontology by
systematizing the will to power, he becomes a moral realist by attacking Christian morality and
calling for a return to morality’s “noble” roots.
This, taken as a whole in Nietzsche’s texts, raise certain paradoxical questions and pose a
task for the reader, namely, how to render consistency between Nietzsche’s perspectivism on the
one hand and his doctrine of the will to power in the other. It is within these paradoxical issues
Michel Foucault bored out the whole of his work on power. Picking up where Nietzsche left off,
Foucault was determined to deliver a view of power which avoided ontological construction and
morally ridden rhetoric. To understand this contrasting approach to understanding power, in the
following chapter I will analyze how Foucault responds to the problems that arise within
Nietzsche’s will to power, and by doing so I will sketch out an illuminating analytical structure
which The Genealogy of Morals will be read into which I will then explore in detail in Chapter
Four following an introduction to The Genealogy in Chapter three. This textual analysis will
advance my hypothesis that the will to power is the central concept within Nietzsche’s
philosophy, and it will also provide me a potent avenue to clarify two of the most inaccessible
philosophers of all time.
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Chapter 2
Foucault: Power as Analytics
In the previous chapter I demonstrated that Nietzsche’s philosophy may not be divorced
from his ontological conception of the will to power. Whether tacitly assumed or explicitly laid
out, the will to power is the central concept informing Nietzsche’s philosophical claims and
projects. I have also demonstrated that this fact necessarily renders Nietzsche’s philosophy
paradoxical and contradictory when his doctrine of perspectivism is considered.
In this chapter, I will call upon the work of Foucault to help understand this paradoxical
quality of Nietzsche’s philosophy. First, I will layout the contrasting Foucauldian notion of
power (as opposed to the will to power) and thereby sketch an accessible and applicable
analytical framework to further grasp Nietzsche’s ontological paradox by analyzing the “First
Essay" of his work, The Genealogy of Morals. I undertake this Foucault-inspired interpretation
of the Genealogy in subsequent chapters. In this chapter I focus on how this Foucauldian crossexamination will lead to a more complete understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy, specifically
its inherent paradoxes, where they come from, and how (or if) they could have been avoided.
If Nietzsche’s conception of how power operates is analogous to a simplistic materialist
view of physics (individual particles simply and endlessly “colliding”), Foucault’s conception of
power is analogous to a quantum mechanical view of physics; a view which denies that the
fundamental building blocks of existence are reducible to quantifiable individual particles.
Quantum mechanics denies the existence of clearly localizable and singular location for the
atom, making mathematical matters much, much more tricky. Nietzsche believed that clearly
distinguishable “wills” conflict and operate under cynical laws which renders power as a
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commodity. For Foucault, asserting that the essence of power lies within individualized localities
operating under ontological pretenses crosses the line of what we can say as consistent
philosophers, and it should therefore be avoided. This ontological denial in turn makes
philosophical matters much more tricky.
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, Nietzsche views the doctrine of the will to
power to be the principle operating law in the universe. The whole of existence is the
embodiment of an eternal struggle of reducibly localizable “wills” which strive towards the
extension and exertion of their power over the rest of existence. This conglomeration of
opposing forces, always operating under a dominance-repression dichotomy, is the proper way to
understand power. Power is a commodity to be possessed, a source of wealth to be strived
towards; it is a status reflecting growth, influence, domination, and exploitation. Nietzsche’s
philosophy commoditized power. For Foucault, power is a completely different concept all
together.
Nietzsche’s conception of power presupposes individual subjects which must necessarily
behave under the ontological constraints of the will to power. Foucault denies the ontological
assumption underlying Nietzsche’s late conceptualization of the will to power, not necessarily
because of the truth value of the doctrine, but because it extends beyond the intrinsic limitations
placed upon the philosopher. This Foucauldian denial of ontology results in a view of power that
is not defined and therefore not restricted by an ontological will. Power is not exclusively the
product of subjects, rather it is a force which shapes subjects and their behavior. Instead of
staking ontological claims regarding the nature of power, Foucault focuses on studying the
expressions of power throughout society. By studying institutions (such as hospitals, prisons,
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schools, military) and discourses, (including science, morality, government, religion) Foucault
believes we can gain insight into the nature of power and how it operates within society. As
Foucault writes regarding his methodology, “Rather than analyzing power from the point of view
of its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonisms of
strategies” (S&P 129). This quote can be read as a direct response to Nietzsche’s ontological
elaborations in The Will to Power. For Foucault, the doctrine of perspectivism and its
accompanying philosophical restraints takes priority over the will to erect an ontological theory.
This strict adherence to the doctrine of perspectivism prevents Foucault from tackling power
head on as Nietzsche frequently did throughout his later work.
For Foucault, “Power” is not to be understood in the Nietzschean sense of being a
commodity which an endless conglomerate of individual “wills” strive towards. When Foucault
refers to power he is referring to the broad ability to have influence over another’s actions. He
writes, “The term “power” designates relationships between “partners” (and by that I am not
thinking of a game with fixed rules but simply, and for the moment staying in the most general
terms, of an ensemble of actions that induce others and follow from one another)” (S&P 135).
This relational property, however, does not have any necessary specific essence which “makes
the engines turn,” so to speak. Power is, rather, what can be drawn from examining the social
network of subjects within society.
Because Foucault avoids tracing and centralizing the origin and property of power within
the ontological creation of the will, he does not trap himself in an a priori mode of
systematization. Any specifically structured system of concepts which seeks to mechanize
existence in order to completely grasp existence must be chiefly concerned with determining the
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elementary conditions for existence. This attempt to reduce reality to its most elementary
conditions is the primary motivation underpinning all ontological construction. The whole is to
be understood in relation to its elementary parts and its elementary parts in relation to the whole.
It is no mistake that the most renowned builders of ontology throughout the history of
philosophy were deeply entrenched with religion, as Foucault points out this conceptual origin—
the preconditions for existence—“comes before the body, before the world and time; it is
associated with the gods, and its story is always sung in theogony” (143). This quote illustrates
the primary cause of academic controversy regarding Nietzsche’s work on the will to power. At
times Nietzsche actively denies the religious task of constructing an ontological origin, yet it is
undeniable that in The Will to Power he is making an attempt to formulate an origin for his
ontological claims on the world (so as to be able to “come from” a conceptual ground). Foucault
delivers a Nietzschean critique of Nietzsche and correctly points out that his later work goes
against his early commandments.
To understand this Nietzschean inconsistency, Foucault makes the observation that
throughout the course of Nietzsche’s writings, he uses differing German words to denote the
English word “origin.” When Nietzsche refers to the task of ontological construction—the
creation of a philosophical starting premise—he uses Ursprung (Ur meaning “primordial” and
sprung meaning “leap”) which is to be understood as “coming forth” from the origin. The
etymology of Ursprung indicates that it was originally a synonym of the word Quelle, which
means “water spring.” According to Foucault, Nietzsche invokes Ursprung in an abstract sense,
cultivating an image of a water stream “springing” up from the ground as an analogy for how
ontological premises behave philosophically. On the other hand, when referring to an “origin” a
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genealogical method arrives at, he uses Herkunft. The prefix Her indicates “from” and Kunft
indicates a “coming.” However, the term Kunft is a derivation of the verb kommen and therefore
the term Herkunft origin will be something necessarily on the horizon which is to be understood
as “coming to” us or coming to be. (NGH 141). While Urpsrung is a type of origin which
“springs” from a single source, Herkunft is a type of origin which is “excavated” by a
genealogical methodology. This distinction will become extremely important to distinguish
Foucault’s methodology from Nietzsche’s. Foucault avoids this quest for Ursprung, a Cartesian
starting point for understanding power, and instead focuses on what can be drawn from our
phenomenological and historical investigations of the relationship between power, ourselves, and
society.
The result of Foucault’s approach to analyze rather than to define power is the acquisition
of “oblique” knowledge through a genealogical mode of analysis. This form of knowledge is
oblique in the sense that Foucault’s analysis utilizes institutions and cultural discourses as
mediums to view power. It is as if Foucault sees himself in a room with an object but separated
from the object by a conceptual wall. Yet there is a mirror—a very foggy and distorted mirror—
on the opposite side of the room which renders movements of the object on the other side of the
wall visible. Unlike Nietzsche, Foucault is not directly studying power in and of itself.6 When
Nietzsche theoretically elaborates upon the logic and inner workings of the will to power he is
analyzing power “in and of itself”. This direct treatment of the Ursprung of power amounts to
the ontological task which directly contradicts Nietzsche’s notion of perspectivism. Foucault

When Nietzsche theoretically elaborates upon the logic and inner workings of the will to power he is
analyzing power “in and of itself.” This direct treatment of power amounts to the ontological task which
contradicts Nietzsche’s notion of perspectivism.
6
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avoids this direct treatment of power to circumvent the same philosophical and paradoxical trap
Nietzsche tragically fell into. For Foucault, we can see that power is and must be operating,
however we can never articulate the essence of power divorced from the active and subjective
relationships between human beings. Foucault’s methodology maintains a methodological
distance from positive conceptual systems understood as original from an Ursprung.
From the vantage point of an absolute distance, free from the restraints of positive
knowledge, the origin [Herkunft] makes possible a field of knowledge whose
function is to recover it, but always in a false recognition due to the excesses of its
own speech. The origin lies at a place of inevitable loss, the point where the truth
of things corresponded to a truthful discourse, the site of a fleeting articulation
that discourse has obscured and finally lost (NGH 143).
The German linguistic distinction between Henkunft and Ursprung here strikingly illustrates the
contrast between Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s understanding of power. Nietzsche’s articulation of
the will to power as a universal law, the universal law, is an origin which is come from
[Ursprung]. Foucault’s eagerness to avoid staking ontological claims regarding power in and of
itself is a view of the origin which is genealogically arrived at [Herkunft]. While Foucault can
see movements in the foggy mirror reflecting the walled off other side of the room, he is
nonetheless restricted from being able to objectify, to conceptually crystalize, what the
movement on the opposite side of the wall really is.
The Foucauldian methodology of power analysis, while attempting to arrive at an
understanding of power, is intrinsically limited in what it can posit regarding the nature of power
due to the necessity of rigidly denying ontological origins. Therefore, Foucault does not provide
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a theory of power, but instead gives us power as an analytical tool. Nietzsche seemed to have
adequately evaded the conviction of utilizing an ontological launching pad early in his work,
however it is undeniable he frequently committed this sin as his philosophy—or perhaps simply
his age— matured.
While the grammar of “analyzing power” suggests power to be a tangible “thing” which
is being analyzed, Foucault asserts that power in and of itself is a non-thing. Foucault explains in
The Lectures at the College de France later published as Society Must be Defended.
[Power] is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be
appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and
individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to
both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting
targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through
individuals. It is not applied to them (SMBD 29).
This passage articulates Foucault’s notion of power to be much more amorphous than
Nietzsche’s view of power as a commodity. For Foucault, it is not as though there is a field of
individuals striving towards power, rather there is a field of socially interrelated individuals, and
the relational property which renders individuals into a social unity is what defines power. Due to
Foucault’s anti-definitional and indirect approach to studying power, it is difficult to say much
more about what exactly Foucault is referring to when he speaks of “power.” Contra Nietzsche,
Foucault is not interested where power comes from, but instead asks who wields power and how
it is exercised.
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Foucault sets out to answer these questions through a strict genealogical excavation and
analysis of history and modern discourse. The differences between Foucault’s and Nietzsche’s
genealogical methodology emerge in their respective genealogical works (illuminating this will
be the chief concern of Chapter Four below). For Foucault, it is essential to distinguish between
history in the broad sense and a genealogy. Foucault identifies that in western culture, the
concept of “History” is inseparable from a grand meta-narrative predicated upon linear
progression of a particular group of people. This predisposition to fit the events of history along
an upward and one-dimensional trajectory leaves no room for discontinuities, retractions, or
outside perspective. Foucault’s genealogical method of analyzing history, on the other hand,
“rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It
opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’.” (NGH 140) This rejection of a meta-historical narrative
forces the genealogist to direct his or her studies towards the differing perspectives throughout
time. This allows for a more broad and more complete recognition of the make-up of the
capillaries of power which flow throughout social formations.
The genealogist studies the hushed voices, the forgotten groups, the documents lost in the
shadows of the grand march of history. As Foucault notes, “It operates on a field of entangled
and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many
times” (NGH 139). By obtaining such a broad, obscure, and conflicting mass of information, the
genealogist is able to peer into the vast and relative network of power relationships embedded
within any social arrangement. By immersing oneself within the multiplicity of perspectives
which constitute a social body, the genealogist observes a vast number of perspectives all
directly related to an individual’s position within the social body. It is at this point the
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genealogist reaches a limit. To travel further is to plunge oneself into the abyss and paradox of
ontological systematizations of the world. This philosophical barrier is a result of the fact that the
manner in which a society is arranged—a direct expression of power—must necessarily be
relative to its unique circumstances. It is relative not only to respective individual societies, but
also relative to respective individuals and groups of individuals within that society. Therefore, an
attempt to universalize how power must fundamentally behave is flawed ipso facto because
power does not have a universal focal point, “an essence,” which can be understood divorced of
social formations and subjective experience within society. After all, as Foucault points out, there
could be no “power” divorced from social formations because social formations are what
fundamentally constitute “power.” “Power” just is how social groups coordinate and exercise
actions. There is no metaphysically independent thing called “power” existing outside of those
social actions no more than there would be an object called a “dance” outside of the actions of
set of dancers.
The result of a strictly oblique genealogical approach to surveying history puts the
genealogist in a position to peer into the shadowy realm of power operations. The nuances,
contradictions, and reality of humanity's social make up cannot be fully grasped if one is caught
up in the “Grand Western Narrative of History,” a circular and self-serving history power itself
has produced. Without the illumination of a teleological historical light, the genealogist is
intrinsically limited to what can be said regarding the shadowy nature of power in and of itself;
however, an analysis of history from a genealogical perspective indirectly reveals how power
operates throughout society and history.
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Foucault’s work Madness and Civilization genealogically traces the history of madness
and its relation to society and reason. He conducts this examination by studying European
clinical documents and records, governmental institutions, and other anthropological artifacts
spanning a large time period. He analyzes the entangled, non-linear “development” of how
European culture understood and treated those to be considered “mad.” For example, in the
Renaissance those considered “mad” were viewed to be endowed with a glorified perspective,
they were to be considered closer to God. Thus sensuality, romanticism, and poetry prospered
during the Renaissance epoch: “In the Renaissance, madness was present everywhere and misled
with every experience by its images or its dangers” (MAC 70). However, the dawn of the
Enlightenment brought about a view that madness was something unfavorable, something that
justified exile, exiled in the same manner lepers were in the 12th century. This excavation of
madness’s and reason’s relationship with civilization obliquely uncovers aspects of how power
operated within European society over time. By using the history of madness as a medium of
study, information regarding power (who wielded it, how it is imprinted through language, how
power is enforced) is revealed. The way certain societies perceived and dealt with “madness”
invariably (and indirectly) reveals information about the structure and ideals propagating those
societies. For Foucault, these findings indicated that madness is the shadow of the development
of the discourse of “reason." In periods of time where “reason" was championed as the guiding
light of society, madness became an object of classification, institutionalization, and prescription.
Because Foucault does not first postulate the nature of power and then make claims
regarding its behavior [Herkunft], he sidesteps the paradoxical issues which Nietzsche fell victim
to in his later works. Foucault’s framework may be broadly applied to conducting an inquiry into
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any discourse or cultural artifact so as to arrive [Herkunft] at an understanding of the power
based relations underlying any given social formation. From about the 17th to 18th century,
America’s cultural ethos was largely centered around a very strong Puritan faith. For this reason,
the dominant form of literary discourse was almost solely defined by adhering to Puritan
ideological tropes. Authors such as John Bunyan, Thomas Watson, and Johnathan Edwards all
dominated the cultivation and circulation of literature in America during this time period, and all
of their writings featured Puritan themes such as hilltop sermons, the judgement of God,
predestination, and the protective grace of God (Baxter). The reason the dominant literary
discourse of early colonial America took its particular form is because the literature itself was
simply an expression of the power structure running throughout society.7 With the genealogical
methodology in mind, early colonial America may be examined and understood by evaluating
the overarching themes, structures, and archetypes present in its literature. This is the precise
limit of the Foucauldian power analysis, however. It can tell us what the structure of a society
must entail by deducing what must be in place for a discourse to take a particular form in the first
place. Any claims beyond what cannot be drawn genealogically are not accessible by way
Foucault’s methodology and begin to fall in the realm of Ursprung.
Conducting an analytics of power by using institutions and discourse as an object of
study obliquely elucidates aspects of how power must be operating within a society, how it
informs our passions, how it leaves its mark on linguistics, and how it is able to change over
time. By avoiding a historical meta-narrative, Foucault is free from the teleological restraints of a
It is important to recognize this loop: What a culture’s values are inform what a culture’s discourse
entails. The discourse a culture consumes informs a culture’s beliefs and values in an effect like that of an
echo chamber. This paradoxical feedback loop raises many questions regarding axiomatic paradigms,
where they receive their meaning, and how they come and go over time.
7
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traditional Western approach to history. This also creates a difficulty of understanding exactly
what Foucault means when he refers to power, as it is something which can never be captured
through straightforward positive knowledge.
To summarize, Foucault views power not as a commodity or as a wealth endowing
object; he views power as a necessarily existing social relational property which ebbs and flows
through the capillary system of social relations within any given society. Power is something
which can be indirectly analyzed by genealogically excavating and investigating discourses and
institutions. By understanding how power operates within and throughout society, we may come
to a better understanding of how we as individuals are molded and formed by the external
operations of power.
With this Foucauldian notion of an analytics of power as secured in this chapter, I will
proceed in the next chapter by applying it to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. The goal of this
analytical cross-examination is not only to further make clear both Nietzsche and Foucault’s
philosophies, but to advance my overarching claim that the will to power is inseparable from the
whole and heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy. This analysis will also serve to further examine the
inevitable paradoxes riddled throughout Nietzsche’s work, why they arose, what they mean, and
what can be gained by considering them. In the next chapter, I will begin by giving a brief
introduction to The Genealogy of Morals, and then in the following Chapter Four I will march
through the “First Essay” of The Genealogy of Morals and demonstrate that an ontological
notion of Nietzsche's will to power must be operating as Ursprung. The groundwork of this
chapter will then be used to analyze and critique this view of Nietzsche. This will provide an
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ideal pathway to work towards understanding the value of the paradox of Nietzsche’s doctrine of
the will to power and perspectivism.
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Chapter 3
Nietzsche’s Genealogy: An Introduction
In the first chapter of this thesis, I laid out Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power and
demonstrated that not only is it inseparable from the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy but that it
simultaneously renders his philosophy knotted in contradiction and paradox. In the previous
chapter, I detailed Foucault’s differing approach to power as a means to illuminate the
differences between Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s methodologies. Throughout the rest of this
thesis, I will hold the Foucauldian notion of power as a critical lens to Nietzsche’s ontological
doctrine of the will to power. In the following chapter, I will utilize the “First Essay” of
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals as a medium to demonstrate that the will to power is the most
reductive and universal concept within Nietzsche’s philosophy: reductive and universal because
the will to power is the singular reductive essence Nietzsche explicitly attributes to everything in
the universe. For Nietzsche, the will to power is the unmoved mover, the engine which churns
his thought and motivates his projects. Chapter four will illustrate this fact even further by
demonstrating the presence of Nietzsche’s ontological assumption of the will to power in the
“First Essay” of The Genealogy of Morals .
Before this demonstration, however, a brief introduction to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of
Morals is necessary. The Genealogy of Morals is a collection of three essays, each of which are
able to stand on their own but all of which are linked by a common thread: a genealogical inquiry
into the origin of moral valuations. The book is explicitly intended to be an extension and
expansion on the ideas in Nietzsche’s earlier work, Beyond Good and Evil. Much insight into the
nature of these two works can be gained by simply evaluating their titles. In Beyond Good and
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Evil, Nietzsche provides a sprawling collection of aphorisms which attempt to evaluate the
nature of moral phenomena separated from any sense or form of morality. Put differently, he
analyzes morality from a perspective external to moral valuation. Contra to philosophers such as
Kant, who were primarily concerned with determining what was “right” in a moral sense,
Nietzsche was interested in determining where the cultural and linguistic conception of “right”
came from in the first place. To reach an understanding of the origin of moral valuations, one
must remove any lens of moral discourse and analyze it as an object of examination, rather than
to wield it as the tool of examination.
This amoral position was carried over and explicitly fleshed out in Nietzsche’s Genealogy
of Morals. In this work, Nietzsche traces the histories of morality in all of its ebbs and flows, in
order to arrive at an understanding of the origin and meaning of moral valuations. Imagine the
world in which the earliest hominids who could be considered "human beings” emerged. This
state of nature, barren of any linguistically bound mode of communication and knowledge, was
also barren of systems of thought and therefore systems of ideology and morality. What is “good
and evil" to the lion stalking gazelle in the Serengeti? Nietzsche formulated his personal
questions accordingly in the preface for The Genealogy:
Under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? And
what value do themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or furthered
human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the
degeneration of life? Or is there in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, force, and
will of life, its courage, certainty, future? (GOM 17)
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Nietzsche believed that insight into these questions may be reached by conducting a genealogical
inquiry into the origins of moral valuations. While his procedural approach to genealogy is
grounded in historicity (yet contains Nietzsche’s characteristic literary playfulness), it is
important to emphasize the detachment of a Nietzschean view of history from any notion of an
“evolutionary” approach to history. Put differently, like Foucault, Nietzsche does not treat the
history of morality as a linear, unidirectional progression which is logically or teleologically
progressing for the better per se. On the contrary, Nietzsche sees the actuality of events in history
to be spontaneous, petty, counter-intuitive, and ultimately unable to be shoe horned into any sort
of intelligible narrative of progress. The history of morality is rather to be understood as an
expression and development of a quintessential first order drive embedded in all humanity: the
will to power.8
The importance of this anti-ontological, historical approach will be further articulated in
the subsequent chapter of this thesis. For now, however, it is important to associate Nietzsche’s
notion of history as opposed to a grand narrative with his attempt to “jump out” of the system of
moral valuations in order to more clearly grasp it as an object of critique (rather than a tool for
critique).
The Genealogy of Morals is grounded in philology, historicity, anti-religious sentiment,
and an acute understanding of ancient Greek culture, and it paints an intricate picture of morality
as a symptom of the inherent will to power within humanity. Nietzsche believes this truth

Notice the contradiction between denouncing meta-narratives then positing the will to power as a metanarrative. If Nietzsche is right and meta-narratives cannot be accepted, what are we to do with his metanarrative? Moreover, is the assertion of the impossibility of meta-narratives on the grounds of the limits of
our perspectives not also tacitly employing a meta-narrative (meta-narratives fail because this is how the
world works) to bolster its claim? These are the very paradoxical questions motivating my investigations
within this thesis.
8
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becomes self-evident following a distanced and thorough examination not only of human history
writ large, but also introspectively of ourselves. Nietzsche’s “Preface” to the Genealogy begins
as such:
We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge—and with good reason. We
have never sought ourselves—how could it happen that we should ever find
ourselves? […] So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not
comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law “Each
is furthest from himself” applies to all eternity—we are not ‘men of knowledge’
with respect to ourselves. (GOM 15).
From this passage it is clear that Nietzsche views the general public—especially those in
academic circles—to be out of touch with their true essence. Buried beneath and distorted by
discourses such as morality and religion, Nietzsche seeks to uncover this essential truth “we
men of knowledge” have misunderstood for so long by inquiring into the origin of moral
valuations. A thorough examination of the “First Essay” of The Genealogy of Morals will
illustrate that Nietzsche views this essential truth to be the will to power.
The Genealogy is not exclusively grounded in historical analysis. It is also heavily
grounded in psychological consideration of the motivations for morality, and it takes a sort of
myth building to tell the story. For Nietzsche, morality is a conceptual system which is grafted
over the field of phenomenological reality, a falsified understanding of reality, which must have
sprung from the minds of human beings. Nietzsche’s refusal to view morality as a religiously
ordained and objective discourse leads his investigation into trying to understand what human
motivation may have led to the emergence and nature of moral systems of thought. The
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juxtaposition of the morality of Nietzsche’s time and the morality of ancient Greek society posed
a puzzling predicament for Nietzsche: ancient Greek morality, and the morality of all early
civilizations (closer to the origin of morality), fundamentally are conversely related to
contemporary Judeo-Christian values.
This problem of the moral inversion of valuations and its societal implications are
thoroughly explored and fleshed out in The Genealogy of Morals. Throughout the remainder of
this paper, the “First Essay” of The Genealogy of Morals will be carefully summarized and
analyzed. More specifically, to show that the will to power is the conceptual heart pumping life
to ancillary topics in Nietzsche’s philosophy, the “First Essay” of The Genealogy of Morals will
be utilized to deduce that the will to power as an ontological mechanism must have been
assumed and utilized by Nietzsche. This ontological and moral position Nietzsche assumes will
necessarily be ridden with strange paradoxes. Foucault’s methodology of pure genealogy will be
adopted to understand the origin, meaning, and significance of these paradoxes within the
context of Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole. When this analysis is complete, a truly ironic and
potent—both tragic and comedic—elucidation of Nietzsche’s philosophy will be rendered. This
rendition of Nietzsche will ultimately pose existential and pressing questions for our roles and
abilities as philosophers in this strange phenomenon we have come to title “being”.
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Chapter 4
Genealogy of Morals Essay One: “Good and Evil,” “Good and Bad”
This chapter compromises my dissection and discussion of the “First Essay” of
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. Keeping Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power in mind, I
will walk through the major themes of the “First Essay” and strive to show that, implicit or
explicit, the conceptual engine churning the gears of Nietzsche’s thought is an ontological
assumption that there is an inherent will to power inherent to humanity. As I pointed out earlier,
this essentialist rendition of Nietzsche necessarily knots his work in unmistakable irony and
paradox. After extracting this paradox through a textual analysis of the “First Essay” of The
Genealogy of Morals, Foucault’s work on power and genealogy will be utilized to help us
understand the meaning of this ontological Nietzschean conundrum.
The “First Essay” of The Genealogy of Morals begins by referring to individuals who
believed the origin of morality was to be explained through a Darwinian framework, as
Nietzsche calls them “These English psychologists, whom one has also to thank for the only
attempts hitherto to arrive at a history of the origin of morality” (GOM 24). Nietzsche
immediately calls into question the English psychologists’ Darwinian attempts to arrive at the
origin of morality and categorizes them as futile and bereft of any nuanced historical spirit.
These English psychologists—Herbert Spencer, for instance—utilized a Darwinian theoretical
framework to explain the historical development of altruistic systems of morality as an
expression of the maximization of evolutionary benefit to human societies. This evolutionary
utility (“survival of the ethical”) is what, for these English psychologists, gives the word “Good”
its moral power and pragmatic stakes in society. According to such a view, that humanity
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developed robust moral systems and has become increasingly domesticated over time is a direct
result of our psychological impulses being predicated upon doing the “right” thing for our
survival. It is the “invisible hand of evolution” which has molded humanity as such and its moral
values.
For these English psychologists like Herbert Spencer, morality is purely a development of
human evolution. Nietzsche uses this Darwinian meta-view of history as his incision point for
illuminating his own view of the origin of morality:
The source of the concept “good” has been sought and established in the wrong
place: the judgement “good” did not originate with those to whom “goodness” was
shown! Rather it was “the good” themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful,
high-stationed and high-minded, who felt themselves and their actions as good,
that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common
and plebeian (GOM 26).
Notice Nietzsche’s radical departure from the Darwinian view of the origin of morality. For
Nietzsche, Darwinist evolution (survival of the fittest = survival of the ethical) is not antecedent
for the rise of moral valuations. It was not the selfless who initially developed systems of
valuation and defined valuative terms such as “good” and “bad,” rather it was those who were
powerful enough to rise to a position to have the authority make valuations.
The “First Essay” of the Genealogy progresses by creating a distinction between “good
and bad” and “good and evil” as two separate developments of morality. Originally, noble
societies used “good and bad” to designate valuative terms defining themselves (the nobles) as
“good,” and the weak as “bad.” Nietzsche finds that sometime along the history of mankind,
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“good and bad” inverted in meaning to the terms “good and evil.” What was originally “bad”
became “good” and what was “good” became “evil.” This shift in morality was brought upon by
a cultural struggle Nietzsche characterizes as a sort of master-slave dialectic. On one end of the
dialectic, there are the slaves. The slaves (as illustrated by the initial valuation of “bad”) feel
ressentiment towards those who are exerting dominance over them, as their state of being
oppressed bars them from expressing their own power. Out of a thirst to express their own
dominance, their own power, the slaves, the repressed, are compelled by the psychological force
of ressentiment to overcome their downtrodden state and to invent ways to express their own
power. This lead to an inversion of values, a “slave revolt” as Nietzsche calls it—the result of a
cultural struggle between master and slave class.
Nietzsche continues his refutation of the Darwinian view of morality by directing our
attention to the etymology of the word “good” across different languages. Nietzsche says that the
various uses of the concept “good”:
all led back to the same conceptual transformation—that everywhere “noble,”
“aristocratic” in the social sense, is the basic concept from which “good” in the
sense of “with an aristocratic soul,” “noble,” “with a soul of high order,” “with a
privileged soul” necessarily developed: a development which always runs parallel
with that other in which “common, “plebeian,” “low” are finally transformed into
the concept “bad.” (28).
It is very important to see here that Nietzsche does not just identify that this moral inversion
happened, but that it happened everywhere. Whether Nietzsche’s conclusion was arrived at
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through purely historical analysis [Herkunft] or mythical construction [Ursrpung] cannot be
resolved at this point in The Genealogy. Regardless, it becomes clear that Nietzsche views this
matter through a universal scope. It also becomes clear that he views humanity to be universally
placed upon the same cultural trajectory in that, in all early societies—when man was pitted
against nature—the strong, the noble, and the heroic were the ones determining the content of
moral valuative words. A slave was in no position to declare the meaning of things. As man
became more and more civilized the crowd, the plebeian, and the lowly grew in numbers and
therefore power.
The idea that the origin of morality is explained by the evolutionary utility of altruism is
decisively called into question when the original usage of these valuative terms currently utilized
by altruistic systems of morality is discovered to have a prior meaning expressing quite the
opposite sentiment. This linguistic difference and conceptual incompatibility of the two
developments of morality demonstrates that the origins of moral valuations must be contrary to
the view of Nietzsche’s English contemporaries.
Based on his etymological investigation, Nietzsche concludes that any given moral
“concept denoting political superiority always revolves itself into a concept denoting superiority
of soul” (31). This rule of self-servility can clearly be seen when examining early forms of
“noble” morality. In these early societies—especially the Greeks, Vikings, and Samurai—those
who rose to power were the strong, the proud, the vengeful, and because these individuals were
in positions of power, they had the self-perceived right to determine the proper way to evaluate
the world.
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So how did this noble conception of morality—good and bad—give way to the altruistic
egalitarian conception of good and evil? Nietzsche believes the solution is to be found in the
same psychological faculty in which the erection of Noble morality was formulated: the inherent
drive within individuals to express their power, or put more simply, the will to power. The
inversion of moral valuations Nietzsche identifies was the result of a master-slave dialectical
system which is predicated upon the notion that there is an inherent will to power present in the
subjects within the system. Remember, Nietzsche identified the inversion of morality as a global
and universal phenomenon. The movement of the master-slave dialectic is only realized if the
slaves—those who cannot express power—feel ressentiment towards their oppressors.
If a notion of will to power was not assumed by Nietzsche, there would have been no
grounds to declare the change of morality as an “inversion” or “revolution,” there simply would
have been a historically observable change. But Nietzsche went further than that. He went on to
claim to know why morality shifted as thus, and this assertion of knowing why contains the
precipice of paradox within this text. If we hold Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism to be true,
Nietzsche is crossing the proverbial “line drawn in the sand” for the philosopher by making such
rudimentary and universal claims about human nature.
Nietzsche’s explicit usage of ressentiment as an explanatory mechanism for the master
slave dialectic illustrates that, while Nietzsche did not explicitly lay out the ontological
assumption of the will to power in The Genealogy, he was undeniably implicitly making an
assumption of the idea’s universality. In what follows of my analysis of "Essay One” of The
Genealogy of Morals, I will provide further evidence to corroborate this claim and further flesh
out its philosophical implications.
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When the noble class—conquering nature and establishing society—procured the earliest
systems of moral valuations, they did so to further garnish their feeling of power and control
over nature and consequently society. This inert disposition to create circular systems of values
led to the categorical term “good” to be used for self affirmation and “bad,” (or later, “evil”) to
vindicate those who were considered on the other side of this ideological duality. This moral
affair gave rise to a psychological state of dissonance which occurs when one’s ability to express
power is reproached. This hateful, jealous, and petty state of mind is what Nietzsche called
ressentiment (GOM 7).
It was through ressentiment the slave class was compelled to create the means to usurp
the privilege to define moral valuations and therefore express their own power over the world.
When ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the
ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and
compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality
develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset
says No to what is “outside,” what is “different” what is “not itself”; and this No
is its creative deed (36).
Because the slave is by definition unable to exert her or his power upon the physical world, and
because for Nietzsche every human is driven by a desire for power, the slave does not simply
“give up” when her or his will to power is repressed, rather her or his will to power is transposed
inwards to the world of ideas. In this strange, shadowy, and unknown to the master psychical
realm, the slave is compelled by a will to power to plot a revenge upon the master and
consequently find a way to affirm their own existence.
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To make this point more concrete in a crude manner, consider the stereotypical high
school duality of “jock” and “nerd.” The jocks think they are good because they can beat up
anyone who messes with them. The nerds, unable to prevent their endless beatdowns and
wedgies at the hands of the jocks, declare The jocks to be evil and themselves to be good, as they
are “smart” (but weak) while the Jocks are “dumb” (but strong). This analogy highlights the
basic points and psychological mechanisms in the master-slave dialectic of morality. When two
or more distinct groups of people are positioned in a dominance-repression dichotomy, the group
that is dominated generates ressentiment towards their oppressors and seek alternative methods
to shift the state of affairs in their favor.
But why does the dominated group necessarily generate this psychological residue
Nietzsche calls ressentiment? Because the slaves’ state of being dominated represses a natural
and universal human drive—the will to power. Nietzsche writes: “This need to direct one’s view
outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave
morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external
stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction” (GOM 37). Notice how
Nietzsche emphasizes the necessity—the need—for the slave to direct his or her ressentiment
outwards. The high school nerd does not want to simply be known as “weak” and inherently
oppressed. It is this self-awareness of the externality of the slave’s position which motivates
moral action—the condemnation of jocks as “dumb brutes.” While Nietzsche characterizes the
slaves’ action as fundamentally reactionary, it nonetheless is predicated upon the same goal of
the master: the expression and extension of power. Recall Nietzsche’s later formulation of the
will to power:
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My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to
extend its force (—its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its
extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies
and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are
sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the
process goes on— (WTP 636).
This illustration makes it vividly clear why the slave generates ressentiment (because every body
strives to extend its will to power) and why slave morality was conjured. Again, if Nietzsche did
not already assume the existence of a universal will to power while writing The Genealogy of
Morals, he would be in no position to make any positive claims regarding an explanation for
origin of morality and the inversion of morality. Doing so necessitates some starting premise,
some preliminary conceptual ground which further claims may be built upon.
For Nietzsche, the origin of systems of morality cannot be attributed to the assumption
that humans will universally act in accords to evolutionary utility, rather the true origin of moral
valuations is found to be inseparably linked to power. It is unclear, however, if Nietzsche is
making an assumption or arriving at this conclusion through a pure genealogical excavation.
Again, a genealogy is a historical method which does not assume any necessary linear
development. It lacks any ontological starting point. The English psychologists’ grave error was
reading into history a contemporary moral theoretical framework. Nietzsche, on the other hand,
seems to be drawing from history [Herkunft] by studying a robust array of historical forms of
knowledge and culture. At the same time, Nietzsche also seems to be reading into history a
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universal ontology [Ursprung] with regards to the psychological mechanism of ressentiment.
This is yet another illustration of the paradoxes within Nietzsche’s philosophy.
While the two opposing value systems of “Good and Bad” and “Good and Evil” come
from the same psychological drive—a will to express power—the manner in which they were
constructed are fundamentally antithetical. The noble conceived the basic concept of good by
spontaneously affirming the characteristic traits that led them to a position of power: strength,
bravery, and a great threat of violence. The slaves9, in a flurry of ressentiment towards the noble,
generated their own conception of “good,” not through self affirmation, but through a concession
that they are different than their oppressors, and that difference is precisely what defines “good.”
Because the rise of slave morality happened later in history, as it must, Nietzsche fundamentally
views the slave’s egalitarian morality of altruism as a symptom of decadence; an ailment which
torments and self-depreciates the host. “To dominate barbarians Christianity had need of
barbarous concepts and values…Christianity desires to dominate beasts of prey; its means for
doing so is to make them sick” (AC 144). In this characterization we can see the seeds of
Nietzsche’s grounds for his relentless moral attacks on Christianity. Moral attacks grounded in an
ontological assumption of the will to power, one which sees the Christian restriction and denial
of the will to power as alienating and contrary to our true nature as humans. Because he holds
this assumption, he sees the tactics of the Christians—the exemplars of slave morality—to be a
mischievously disguised plot conjured in order to express power.

To be clear, when Nietzsche refers to “Slaves” in this sense he is not referring to literal slaves in the
legal sense, instead it is a placeholder term for individuals who become repressed by greater forms of
power (“Master’s”) and therefore possess ressentiment towards their oppressors
9
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By identifying the development of these two systems of morality to have sprung from the
same seed, the same desire, Nietzsche is aggressively calling into question the value of systems
of altruistic morality. Contra to what Darwinian scholars of Nietzsche’s time believed, morality
is not the product of some unidirectional evolutionary instinct towards altruism. Rather altruistic
moral systems were born from hate, jealousy, and a lust for revenge and power. They were born
from ressentiment. Because “the bad” could not solve their restriction of power by lashing
outwards towards their oppressors, they were forced to turn inwards, into the realm of ideas, to
plot revenge on those who called themselves “good.” The slave labeled the master “not good”
but “evil” and deduced (as an afterthought) that they—the meek, the lowly, the pitiful—were the
good. The slaves consequently deferred their power to a raging all powerful deity, a deity who
commanded their values and enforced them too. By obeying their God—who demanded them to
be what they already were, e.g., weak, obedient, servile—they gained power over the natural
world as their distinctive moral valuations became culturally dominant.
The slaves’ real victory, therefore, was getting the proponents of noble morality to believe
their side of the tale. By making the strong think being strong was bad, the slave revolt was
complete. By convincing the noble man he had a soul, the slave infiltrated the noble’s mind and
arranged the ideas in a self-depreciating manner, the slaves became the masters of morality by
wielding the monotheistic God to whom all are subservient, the strong included. The mechanism
by which the slave revolted managed to infiltrate the self-understanding of the masters raises
another important notion in “Essay One” of The Genealogy: the construction of the subject.
Assimilation into moral systems produces variable performative affects depending on the
nature of the system. For example, an orthodox Christian and Muslim fundamentally view the
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world in differing manners as the construction of and assimilation into their belief system reflects
this differentiation. This implies that there is a part of our being that is inherently malleable in
nature. This directly contradicts the Platonic view that “The Soul” is some single and everlasting
object, indeed it contradicts the notion of a Platonic soul all together. If the way we think, don’t
think, act, and don’t act is dependent upon the systems of morality externally impressed upon us
from outside sources, this raises a serious ontological dilemma regarding the status of our “soul,”
our “inner self.” Indeed, this assumption of a singular soul is necessary for moral discourse to be
conducted in the first place. If there was not a “soul” present that possessed the strength “to do
otherwise” all moral discourse would never get off the ground in the first place. Moreover, if this
soul is not immortal and singular, the systems of punishments and rewards Christianity hangs
over believers’ heads would be null and invalid. Nevertheless, Nietzsche denies the existence of
this metaphysical entity, stating:
There is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a
fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything. The popular mind in fact
doubles the deeds when it sees the lightning flash, it is the deed of a deed: it posits
the same event first as cause and then a second time as its effect. Scientists do no
better when they say “force moves,” “force causes”, and the like— (45).
The invention of the soul, therefore, while being a fundamental falsehood, allowed for moral
forms of knowledge to be able to operate in the first place. This passage should immediately
raise eyebrows when Nietzsche’s doctrine of will to power is considered. Is not reducing all of
existence to be “will to power” not doing the same exact thing he is calling a falsehood in this
passage? I posit that it is, and it is also a conceptual necessity in the same vein the creation of the
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soul was a conceptual necessity for the slave. The slave’s morality simply could have never
gotten off the ground if it was not for the essential premise of the enduring nature of the soul.
Similarly, Nietzsche’s philosophy could have never gotten off the ground if it was not for the
essential premise of the universality of the will to power as the essence of being.
At the end of essay one, Nietzsche makes it abundantly clear that his discovery of the
master-slave dialectic does not imply that he is interested in how the dialectic ought to play out.
Rather he is interested in questioning “What light does linguistics, and especially the study of
etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?” (55) Throughout the “First
Essay,” Nietzsche etymologically traced the development of morally categorical terms and
learned that, the further you go back in history, the more various terms for “good” appear to
designate the modern Judeo-Christian view of “evil.” His etymological studies also reveal that
the more ancient usage of terms associated with “bad” designate the contemporary moral usage
of “good.” A complete inversion.
Nietzsche attributes this inversion to the phenomenon of ressentiment, a psychological
mechanism which assumes that humans, at bottom, all have the same inherent drive towards
exerting and perceiving power, even when one’s ability to do so is hindered. Through this lust for
retribution, the slaves (embodied by Judaeo-Christianity) defeated their noble masters by
convincing them that they have a soul and they must not be evil, or their soul will suffer the
consequences for eternity.
While Nietzsche’s moral claims against specific religious institutions are generally
subdued in The Genealogy, his later writings increase in zeal for his hatred of Christianity on the
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grounds of his understanding of the world as will to power. In his polemic work The Antichrist,
Nietzsche wrote:
Wherever the will to power declines in any form there is every time also a
physiological regression, a décadence. The divinity of décadence, pruned of all its
manliest drives and virtues, from now on necessarily become the God of the
physiological retarded, the weak. They do not Call themselves the weak, they call
themselves ‘the good.’(AC 139).
This physiological and psychological affects brought about by religion and morality—the
repression of the will to power—have on us can be very harmful, and for Nietzsche it is grounds
for moral condemnation and judgement. The issue at large here is not necessarily if Nietzsche’s
formulation is a plausible or helpful one, rather the concern is if we can allow him to assert his
own meta-narrative and moral postulations while also allowing him to assert that all ontological
and moral tasks are fundamentally flawed.
Strangely enough, Nietzsche spoke fervently in his ontologically ridden Will to Power
about the fictitious manner in which the discourse of science creates false subjects like “a soul”
with its use of a physical atom: “In order to understand the world, we must be able to reckon it
up; in order to be able to reckon it up, we must be aware of constant causes; but since we find no
such constant causes in reality, we invent them for ourselves and call them atoms. This is the
origin of the atomic theory” (WTP 297). If then, Nietzsche wants to claim that the makeup of
existence is a conflict between reducible wills to powers, we must subject that claim to criticism
by his own doctrine that the creation of any “doer” (a will to power) is necessarily a falsehood.
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The fact is Nietzsche needs the will to power to be an unquestionable truth, for it is the
main explanatory “force” underlying the whole of his philosophy. If he did not make this
ontological assumption, Nietzsche would have just been accredited with identifying two separate
epochs of moral systems, and that’s all. The master-slave dialectic would have no mover and
would have never been able to be conceived. While Nietzsche’s illustration of the master-slave
dialectic is very compelling and potently explanatory, Foucault would tell us that he overstepped
his bounds as a genealogist. Nietzsche constructed the light of an ontological understanding of
the will to power in order to explain the happenings of the shadowy realm he found himself in
while extracting the etymological history of moral terms and the cultures surrounding them.
It is at this juncture Foucault’s notion of power as analytics will serve useful for
addressing this paradoxical irony. At times in The Genealogy, Nietzsche exhibits exquisite
genealogical restraint in not positing the essence of the subject understood in the sense of a
single source or origin [Ursprung], but rather illustrating that two different modes of valuation
have been in a cyclical struggle throughout history so that subjects comprise various and even
competing values [Herkunft]. When, however, he explains this dialectic is moved by
ressentiment, he is creating and tacitly assuming his own conceptual subject, his own
metaphysical instrument, his own physical atom and is therefore straying from the genealogist’s
project and contradicting his own notion of perspectivism. The Foucauldian point here being that
when Nietzsche alludes to the will to power as an explanatory force, he is muddying his own
writings with the ontological sentiments he so vociferously combatted. Nietzsche seems to have
changed his mind regarding the capabilities of himself as an inductive agent sometime later in
his life. He seems to have been so caught up in his will to power that he stepped over everyone
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and everything, even himself, to be rewarded with a grandiose and systematic vision of the truth.
A vision which was never completed.
Foucault finds more problems with Nietzsche’s approach to genealogy as Nietzsche
makes it explicit that, as a genealogist, he is interested in investigating the origins of moral
valuations. Foucault, however, asserts that:
A genealogy of values, morality, asceticism, and knowledge will never confuse
itself with a quest for their “origins,” will never neglect as inaccessible the
vicissitudes of history. On the contrary, it will cultivate the details and accidents
that accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty
malice; it will await their emergence, once unmasked, as the face of the other
(NGH 144).
Because Nietzsche neglects this genealogical patience and distance and rather posits the origin of
altruistic morality in ressentiment, he is in effect using his genealogical analysis as material to
craft a grand mythology regarding the origins of morality. This mythology, like any metanarrative imposed upon history, assumes an ontological essence within subjectivity which
eventually translates into an attempt to create a universal geometry for the totality of reality.
While Foucault doesn’t believe we could deduce the existence of the universality of slave
ressentiment through genealogical investigation, he does recognize that there is an inherent
possibility of resistance within networks of power. “It seems to me that power is ‘always already
there’, that one is never ‘outside’ it.... [But] to say that one can never be ‘outside’ power does not
mean that one is trapped and condemned to defeat no matter what.... [Resistances] are all the
more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are
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exercised” (P&S 141). It seems, therefore, that inherent to this relational property Foucault titles
power is not a definite form of unilateral domination but a possibility of domination and
repression. It is not that the repressed must feel ressentiment, however the possibility either way
is always open under the Foucauldian lens. Despite the fact Foucault never appealed to the will
to power or ressentiment to explain the dialectic of power relationships, he did recognize it was
observable.
Foucault’s methodology not only demonstrates that are there ironic paradoxes present in
Nietzsche’s Genealogy, but also that they arise due to an overstepping of the genealogical
boundary. While Nietzsche uses thorough and nuanced historical analysis in his Genealogy, he
takes it a step further and implicitly created an explanatory mythology and employed an
ontological assumption [Ursprung] as a starting point for this mythology. This is clearly
demonstrated within the master-slave dialectic, ressentiment, as well as his propensity to use his
own mythology as a grounds for moral argumentation.
The master-slave dialectic undisputedly operates if the principles regarding a universal
will to power Nietzsche assumes are in fact in line with reality. This generalization, however, is
necessarily out of the genealogist’s grasp: a genealogy can reveal information about how cultures
came to be, however it can never logically deduce the ontological preconditions, the explanatory
why, for this coming to being. A Foucauldian genealogist will be able to note that two systems of
morality have been engaged in a historical struggle, however she or he will not be able to posit
that any specific psychological mechanism is propping up this state of affairs. To do so is to
contradict the law of perspectivism. According to Foucault, the philosopher may exit the
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proverbial “cave,” however everything she or he sees will be necessarily be mis-recognized and
unable to be articulated due to the limits of human concepts.
Nietzsche is therefore misunderstanding the true essence (non-essence) of power by
articulating it as an “all-out war” performance between countless individual wills to power. For
the genealogist, power is not given meaning through ontological assumptions and metaphysical
scaffolding, rather its nature is revealed by examining the circular relationships inherent to the
construction of the specific field of power relations being analyzed. We can look backwards in
history and observe how things have come to be and observe power’s role in this coming to
being, however we cannot extend our power as philosophers past this and posit universal
principles delineating how things must operate—we can only see that they have operated.
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Conclusion
Nietzsche’s Paradox: The Plight of the Philosopher
So far in my thesis I have elaborated upon a paradoxical element of Nietzsche’s
philosophy, invoked and utilized helpful aspects of Foucault’s philosophy to shine light upon this
paradox, surveyed the “First Essay” of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals and utilized it to
illustrate the presence of this Nietzschean paradox. Secondarily, I have also reflected on the
value of this Nietzschean paradox and what it implies for the task of philosophy. This inquiry of
the meaning of Nietzsche’s paradox will now be explicitly fleshed out to conclude this thesis. On
the one hand, Nietzsche principally believes that there are no facts, only interpretations, and thus
any attempt to erect an all-encompassing system of thought will inevitably collapse in on itself
and is therefore philosophically mistaken ipso facto. On the other hand, Nietzsche also
principally believes that the rudimentary logic of the unfolding of being is to be demarcated as
the will to power. Consider this passage from Beyond Good and Evil:
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the
development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will
to power, as my proposition has it... then one would have gained the right to
determine all efficient force univocally as--will to power. The world viewed from
inside... it would be “will to power” and nothing else (BGE 18).
It would be difficult for Nietzsche to make a more explicit articulation that the will to power is a
central and ontological doctrine in relation to the whole of his philosophy. As his proposition has
it. The italic emphasis on “my” in the passage suggests Nietzsche was at least partially self-aware
of the absurdity for him to be staking ontological claims regarding the world.
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At this juncture, Nietzsche is trying to “have his cake eat it too” by acknowledging the
intrinsic limitations of his discourse, yet nevertheless willing facts—the fact—about the universal
principle underlying existence? Did Nietzsche just believe his theory was the right one? In one
of his earlier works, Human, All Too Human (1878), Nietzsche aphoristically remarked, “The socalled paradoxes of an author to which a reader objects are often not in the author’s book at all,
but in the reader’s head” (HATH 179). Does this imply that it is us, the reader, who is the source
of the “author’s paradox,” not Nietzsche’s inconsistency? The ambiguous nature of this early
Nietzsche aphorism renders it fully irresolvable; nevertheless I will offer my interpretation of its
meaning.
To place the source of “the author’s paradox” on the reader is to imply that to read an
author’s work is to necessarily distort the meaning of the author’s work.10 Because individuals
derive the meaning of values from their own unique subjective interaction with the world, no two
individuals may possess identical valuative palettes, for nobody’s valuative palettes are formed
the same. While individuals may think they share a common ideology with others, this is merely
a superficial belief, as a perfect symmetrical valuative alignment is impossible due to the infinite
amount of nuances separating individuals’ lived experiences from one another.
Nietzsche is not blaming the reader for not possessing identical valuations and
understandings as him; rather, he is pointing out that everyone’s stone, so to speak, is not only
brought into the world shaped differently, but is also weathered by the sands of fate differently.
Thus, Nietzsche is presenting his truth, his vision, and if anyone misunderstands his articulation

To be frank, it isn’t even clear what “author’s paradox” Nietzsche is referring to, however with the rest
of this thesis in mind, I find it highly plausible to be in line with my thought.
10
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of reality it is not his fault, as no-one will ever be able to experience, to know, Nietzsche’s
“Truth.”
What then, are we to do with Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power? What are we to do
with his philosophy as a whole with the “reader’s paradox” in mind? Is Nietzsche dead, and have
we killed him? To answer these questions, I once again recall the passage in The Gay Science
titled “Life No Argument:”
We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live—by the postulating
of bodies, lines, surfaces, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content:
without these articles of faith no one could manage to live at present! But for all
that they are still unproved. Life is no argument; error might be among the
conditions of life (TGS 131).
I believe this passage makes it abundantly clear that Nietzsche anticipated these paradoxical
qualities of his philosophy early on in his career, however these paradoxical qualities did not stop
Nietzsche from singing his song—from creating his art. Nietzsche did not allow the
philosophical restrictions of perspectivism to keep his musings silent, and while he may have
strayed too close to systematic formulations near the end of his career, he nonetheless willed his
truth to the world, despite the seeming impossibility of the task.
So I ask again, what are we to do with Nietzsche, that paradoxical poet? I assert that we
absolutely ought not toss him to the flames; but rather we should listen to Nietzsche’s truth, hold
it to our own, and synthesize the wisdom of our differing perspectives. We are not wrong to point
out a paradoxical and inconsistent aspect of his philosophy, yet this nevertheless does not render
Nietzsche bereft of meaning and value—quite the opposite. We did not throw out Euclid’s
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mathematical principles because perfectly straight lines are impossible; no, instead we applied
his principles to the world and have become much more knowledgeable because of it. While
Euclid’s premises of straight lines and perfect angles are inherently impossible, it was necessary
for him to start somewhere.
Much in the same way, it was necessary for Nietzsche to start somewhere with the will to
power—otherwise there would simply be no “Nietzsche” spoken of today. Indeed, Foucault is
not free from this very philosophical necessity. While he tries to maintain total negative distance
from his object of study, he invariably makes ontological assumptions himself when he tries to
clarify his work in his auxiliary interviews and essays. For instance, consider this passage:
“Power is relations; power is not a thing, it is a relationship between two individuals... such that
one can direct the behavior of another or determine the behavior of another” (WOPI 410). While
this Foucauldian passage is quite illuminating in clarifying his position on power, it nonetheless
tacitly assumes that individuals are universally bound by some ethereal relational property titled:
power. While Foucault would hate to admit it, this is his Ursprung, his ground floating in thin air
supporting his philosophical constructions.
I close this thesis by offering Zarathustra’s final words to his disciples before
disappearing back into the mountains from where he first descended. It is to be read as though
Nietzsche is speaking directly to the reader with the “author’s paradox” in mind.
Now I go alone, my disciples, You too, go now, alone. Thus I want it. Go away
from me and resist Zarathustra! And even better: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he
deceived you…One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a
student… You say that you believe in Zarathustra? But what matters Zarathustra?
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You are my believers—but what matter all believers? You have not yet sought
yourselves; and you found me. Thus do all believers; therefore all faith amounts
to so little. Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have
all denied me will I return to you. (TSZ 59)
Nietzsche knows his philosophy holds no value if someone simply takes his word for it. “Truth”
cannot be simply received, rather it must be individually earned. Of course Nietzsche’s
philosophy, when taken universally, is rendered obscure with perspectivism in mind—but that’s
the point.
Philosophy—while conjured within dark the caves of individual’s perspectives—is
understood (by me) for sharing and illuminating. A philosophy never expressed is no philosophy
at all—everyone has their own worldview and own particular thoughts—but articulation is what
makes the philosopher special. The true philosopher (and not the purely “academic philosopher”)
is the individual whose purpose is to investigate their being’s relationship with the whole of
existence, and to express their findings with others in the hope of refining their understanding
and helping others with their personal quest. The true philosopher does not restrain her or
himself to academic pomp, never singing their own song due to the fear of failure or acceptance
of their intellectual insignificance. No, the true philosopher strives to accomplish the ambitious
task of understanding and becoming who they really are despite the absurdity and impossibility
of this quest. While “The” grand universal articulation of “Truth,” the ideal object of ontology, is
surely unattainable, our “Truths” as individuals is, in fact, attainable. But don’t take my—or
Nietzsche’s—word for it, we must find it all for ourselves by ourselves.
(Is it not right before our very eyes?)
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